Permissions – Codex | OpenAI Developers

Beta. Permission profiles are under active development and may change.

Permission profiles do not compose with the older sandbox settings. Configure either default_permissions and [permissions], or sandbox_mode / sandbox_workspace_write, but not both. If sandbox_mode appears in any active config layer, you pass --sandbox, or a config profile sets sandbox_mode, Codex uses those older sandbox settings instead of default_permissions.

Permission profiles let you apply least-privilege boundaries to local commands Codex runs on your behalf. A profile is a named policy that combines filesystem rules, which define what commands can read or write, with network rules, which define which destinations commands can reach.

Use profiles to give Codex enough access for the current task without granting broad access to your machine or network. For example, a read-only profile can let Codex inspect a project without editing it, while a write-capable profile can limit edits to selected workspace roots.

Local permission profiles are supported on macOS, Linux, WSL, and native Windows. Platform-specific enforcement details and caveats are covered in Security limitations.

For Codex cloud network settings, see Internet Access.

Define and select a profile

Codex includes three built-in permission profiles:

:read-only keeps local command execution read-only.
:workspace allows writes inside the active workspace roots.
:danger-full-access removes local sandbox restrictions and should be used only when that broad access is intentional.

Create a named profile under [permissions.<name>], then set the top-level default_permissions key to that profile name or to one of the built-ins above. In this example, project-edit is a user-defined profile name, not a built-in value.

Custom profiles use two related concepts:

[permissions.<name>.workspace_roots] adds concrete directories that should count as workspace roots for that profile.
[permissions.<name>.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] defines the filesystem rules Codex applies inside every effective workspace root: the current session’s runtime workspace roots plus the profile-defined roots above.

Profiles also use the normal config-layer model. Higher-precedence layers can add or replace entries under the same profile name without restating the whole profile.

For example, an organization-level config and a user-level config can extend the same profile independently:

# /etc/codex/config.toml
[permissions.server.workspace_roots]
"~/code/server" = true

# ~/.codex/config.toml
[permissions.server.workspace_roots]
"~/code/mobile-app" = true

When server is active, both workspace roots participate in the effective profile.

default_permissions = "project-edit"

[permissions.project-edit.workspace_roots]
"~/code/app" = true
"~/code/shared-lib" = true

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"." = "write"
".devcontainer" = "read"
"**/*.env" = "deny"

[permissions.project-edit.network]
enabled = true

[permissions.project-edit.network.domains]
"api.openai.com" = "allow"
"objects.githubusercontent.com" = "allow"
"*.github.com" = "allow"
"tracking.example.com" = "deny"

This profile:

Reads the minimal runtime paths common developer tools need.
Applies the same workspace-root rules to the current session and the profile-defined roots.
Keeps IDE-adjacent settings such as .devcontainer/ read-only under each root.
Denies matching environment files with a glob rule.
Allows network access only through the configured domain policy.

Inside an active profile, narrower deny rules stay in force even when a broader path is readable or writable. For example, a profile can make workspace roots writable while still setting a matching .env path to deny.

Configuration spec

Entry	Type / values	Default	Details
`default_permissions`	String profile name	None	Names the permissions profile Codex applies by default. The value must match a profile under `[permissions]` or a built-in profile such as `:workspace`. Required when permission profiles are active. If an older sandbox setting is active, Codex uses those older sandbox settings instead.
`[permissions.<name>]`	Table	None	Defines a profile and its identifier. `default_permissions` selects one profile as the default; other permission-profile selectors also use the profile name.
`[permissions.<name>.workspace_roots]`	Table	None	Adds profile-defined workspace roots that receive `:workspace_roots` filesystem rules alongside the current session’s runtime workspace roots.
`permissions.<name>.workspace_roots."<path>"`	Boolean	`false`	Adds the path to the profile’s workspace root set when `true`. Entries set to `false` remain inactive.
`[permissions.<name>.filesystem]`	Table	None	Maps filesystem paths to access values or scoped subpath maps. Missing or empty filesystem tables keep filesystem access restricted and emit a startup warning.
`permissions.<name>.filesystem.glob_scan_max_depth`	Number	None	Limits deny-read glob expansion on Linux, WSL, and native Windows when Codex snapshots matches before sandbox startup. Larger values can increase startup scanning work. Use a value of at least `1` when an unbounded `**` pattern needs bounded pre-expansion.
`[permissions.<name>.filesystem]."<path>"`	`read`, `write`, or `deny`	None	Grants direct access for a supported path. `deny` denies access and wins over equally specific `write` or `read` entries. Codex rejects direct write rules that the active runtime cannot enforce.
`[permissions.<name>.filesystem."<path>"]."<subpath>"`	`read`, `write`, or `deny`	None	Grants access to a descendant of `<path>`. Use `.` for the base path. Other subpaths must be relative descendants and cannot contain `.` or `..` components.
`[permissions.<name>.network]`	Table	None	Configures the network sandbox proxy and the sandbox network policy for the profile.
`permissions.<name>.network.enabled`	Boolean	`false`	Enables network access for sandboxed commands in the profile. This changes the sandbox network policy; it does not start the network proxy by itself.
`[permissions.<name>.network.domains]`	Table	None	Maps host patterns to `allow` or `deny`. If there are no `allow` entries, domain requests are blocked. Deny entries override allow entries.
`permissions.<name>.network.domains."<pattern>"`	`allow` or `deny`	None	Supports exact hosts, `.example.com` for subdomains, `.example.com` for apex plus subdomains, and `` as an allow-only global wildcard. Host patterns are normalized by trimming, lowercasing, stripping a trailing dot, and stripping simple ports or brackets.
`[permissions.<name>.network.unix_sockets]`	Table	None	Maps Unix socket allowlist overrides. Use only for local integrations such as Docker.
`permissions.<name>.network.unix_sockets."<path>"`	`allow` or `none`	None	Adds an absolute Unix socket path to the effective allowlist with `allow`, or clears an inherited allow entry with `none`. `none` is not a separate deny-list decision.
`permissions.<name>.network.proxy_url`	URL string	`http://127.0.0.1:3128`	HTTP proxy listener used for `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, websocket proxy variables, and related tool proxy environment variables.
`permissions.<name>.network.enable_socks5`	Boolean	`true`	Enables the SOCKS5 listener used for `ALL_PROXY` and FTP proxy variables.
`permissions.<name>.network.socks_url`	URL string	`http://127.0.0.1:8081`	SOCKS5 listener address.
`permissions.<name>.network.enable_socks5_udp`	Boolean	`true`	Enables SOCKS5 UDP support when the SOCKS5 listener is enabled.
`permissions.<name>.network.allow_upstream_proxy`	Boolean	`true`	Allows the network sandbox proxy to respect upstream `HTTP(S)_PROXY` and `ALL_PROXY` settings for outbound requests.
`permissions.<name>.network.allow_local_binding`	Boolean	`false`	Disables the local/private-network guard when `true`. When `false`, exact local literals such as `localhost` or `127.0.0.1` must be explicitly allowlisted, and hostnames that resolve to local or private IPs remain blocked.
`permissions.<name>.network.dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy`	Boolean	`false`	Allows proxy listeners to bind non-loopback addresses. Leave unset for ordinary local development.
`permissions.<name>.network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets`	Boolean	`false`	Bypasses the Unix socket allowlist where Unix socket proxying is supported. This is a broad local escape hatch.

Filesystem permissions

Filesystem entries use read, write, or deny:

Access	Meaning
`read`	Allows commands to read files and list directories under the path. Commands cannot create, modify, rename, or delete files there.
`write`	Allows commands to read and modify files under the path, including creating, renaming, and deleting files when the OS allows it.
`deny`	Denies both reads and writes under the path. Use it to carve out a denied subpath from a broader `read` or `write` grant.

More specific entries override broader entries. When two entries target the same path, deny takes precedence over write, and write takes precedence over read.

This precedence lets a profile describe a broad working area first, then carve out files or directories that should stay unreadable:

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"." = "write"
".devcontainer" = "read"
"**/*.env" = "deny"

In this example, the workspace root stays writable, .devcontainer/ stays readable without becoming writable, and matching environment files remain unavailable to sandboxed commands.

A more specific path can also reopen a narrower subtree inside a broader deny:

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem]
"~/Documents" = "deny"
"~/Documents/codex" = "write"

Supported path forms:

Path	Meaning	Scoped subpaths
`:root`	The filesystem root	`.` only
`:minimal`	Platform and runtime paths needed by common tools	`.` only
`:workspace_roots`	The current session’s workspace roots plus any enabled profile-defined workspace roots	Yes
`:tmpdir`	The `$TMPDIR` location, when one is available	`.` only
`/absolute/path`	A platform absolute path, such as `/path` on macOS/Linux/WSL or `C:\path` on native Windows	Yes
`~/path`	A path under the current user’s home directory	Yes

On native Windows, home-relative paths can also use backslashes, such as ~\work.

Use :root only when a profile intentionally needs broad read coverage:

[permissions.audit.filesystem]
":root" = "read"

Use nested entries under :workspace_roots to scope access to workspace-root relative subpaths:

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"." = "write"          # each workspace root
"docs" = "read"        # each workspace-root docs directory
"generated" = "deny"   # each workspace-root generated directory

Nested subpaths must stay inside their workspace root. Parent traversal such as ../other-repo is rejected.

Deny reads with exact paths or globs

Use deny for files or subtrees that Codex should not read, even when a broader profile rule grants access nearby. Exact paths work well for stable locations such as ~/.ssh. Glob patterns work better when a profile needs to cover a family of sensitive files whose exact locations vary across repositories.

When a glob sits under :workspace_roots, Codex interprets it relative to each effective workspace root. For example:

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"**/*.env" = "deny"

This rule denies reads for matching .env files found beneath each runtime or profile-defined workspace root. Use it when you want to preserve normal workspace writes while keeping environment files, generated secrets, or similar credential-bearing files unreadable.

deny glob patterns are supported as deny-read rules. read or write globs are less portable on Linux, WSL, and native Windows sandboxing, so prefer exact paths or subtree rules such as "docs/**" = "read" when possible.

On Linux, WSL, and native Windows, an unbounded ** deny-read pattern may need bounded pre-expansion before the sandbox starts. Set glob_scan_max_depth when you use an unbounded pattern such as "**/*.env" = "deny":

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem]
glob_scan_max_depth = 3

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"**/*.env" = "deny"

glob_scan_max_depth must be at least 1. Higher values scan deeper before sandbox startup, which can add startup work on Linux, WSL, and native Windows. If you prefer not to use bounded expansion, enumerate explicit depths such as *.env, */*.env, and */*/*.env.

Add reusable workspace roots to the profile when the same rules should apply to more than the current session root:

[permissions.project-edit.workspace_roots]
"~/code/app" = true
"~/code/shared-lib" = true

When this profile is active, Codex applies the :workspace_roots rules to the current session’s runtime workspace roots and to each enabled profile-defined workspace root.

On native Windows, drive-letter paths such as D:\work and UNC paths such as \\server\share are supported as absolute paths.

Network permissions

Set enabled = true to allow network access for the selected profile:

[permissions.project-edit.network]
enabled = true

When network access is enabled, Codex uses full network behavior by default. Most profiles should also define domain rules:

[permissions.project-edit.network.domains]
"example.com" = "allow"      # exact host
"*.example.com" = "allow"    # subdomains only
"**.example.com" = "allow"   # apex and subdomains
"ads.example.com" = "deny"   # deny wins over allow

The network sandbox proxy binds to local listeners by default:

[permissions.project-edit.network]
enabled = true
proxy_url = "http://127.0.0.1:3128"
enable_socks5 = true
socks_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
enable_socks5_udp = true

Leave these listener settings at their defaults unless you are integrating with a specific runtime. The dangerously_* network keys are escape hatches for specialized environments and should not be used for ordinary local development.

Local and private networks

Codex applies a local/private-network guard by default as a defense against DNS rebinding and accidental access to local services. To intentionally allow a literal local target, allowlist the exact host or IP literal:

[permissions.project-edit.network.domains]
"localhost" = "allow"
"127.0.0.1" = "allow"

Set allow_local_binding = true only when the profile must reach allowlisted hostnames that resolve to local or private addresses:

[permissions.project-edit.network]
enabled = true
allow_local_binding = true

[permissions.project-edit.network.domains]
"localhost" = "allow"

Unix sockets

Unix socket proxying is a local escape hatch for tools such as Docker. Use it sparingly:

[permissions.project-edit.network.unix_sockets]
"/var/run/docker.sock" = "allow"
"/tmp/old.sock" = "none"

Use none to clear a socket allow entry inherited from a lower-precedence configuration layer. It is not a domain-style deny rule.

When Unix sockets are enabled, keep proxy listeners bound to loopback addresses.

Migrate from older sandbox settings

Permission profiles replace the older combination of sandbox_mode and sandbox_workspace_write when you want one reusable profile to describe both filesystem and network behavior. Use one system or the other for a session, not both.

Suggested starting points:

For a read-only workflow, use the built-in :read-only profile or define a custom profile with read access only where needed.
For workspace editing, use the built-in :workspace profile or define a custom profile that writes through :workspace_roots and adds only the extra temp or cache paths the workflow needs.
For unrestricted local execution, use :danger-full-access only when you intentionally want the broadest local access model.

Profiles describe the local default posture for a session. Organization-managed requirements can still add restrictions that user configuration should not broaden. See Managed configuration for admin-enforced filesystem and network constraints.

Scope and enforcement

Permission profiles define the boundaries for local sandboxed command execution. Use them together with approval policies and the separate controls for other Codex surfaces.

What profiles control

Local command execution: Permission profiles govern sandboxed commands that run on your machine. App connectors, MCP servers, browser or computer-use surfaces, Codex cloud environment settings, and approved escalations use their own controls.
Filesystem writes: A write-capable profile can create persistent changes. Treat writes to scripts, build steps, package manager hooks, shell startup files, and shared directories as sensitive because later tools or users can execute those files outside the original sandbox context.
Outbound destinations: Network domain rules constrain where sandboxed command traffic can go through the network proxy. They do not determine whether an allowed destination is trustworthy, and wildcard allow rules stay broad.
Local services: Local and private network targets are blocked by default. Allowlisting localhost, private IPs, Unix sockets, or setting allow_local_binding = true explicitly opens access to local services.

How enforcement works

On macOS, Codex uses Seatbelt sandbox profiles. If the selected policy cannot be enforced by the platform sandbox, Codex refuses to run the command instead of silently running it unsandboxed.
On Linux and WSL, Codex uses bubblewrap and seccomp, with Landlock available for compatibility fallback paths. The strongest enforcement path depends on user namespaces and kernel support; restricted container hosts can force compatibility paths, and unsupported split policies are refused.
On native Windows, elevated sandboxing is strongest because it can use dedicated lower-privilege sandbox users, filesystem permission boundaries, and firewall rules. unelevated sandboxing is a fallback with weaker network isolation and cannot enforce every split read/write carveout, so unsupported policies are refused. Use WSL when you need the Linux sandbox model.

Operational guidance

Choose the narrowest profile that still lets the task complete, especially when you grant writes or outbound network access. Keep approval policy, secret handling, and allow rules aligned with that access level.

Common profiles

Read-only with network allowlist

default_permissions = "readonly-net"

[permissions.readonly-net.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"

[permissions.readonly-net.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"." = "read"

[permissions.readonly-net.network]
enabled = true

[permissions.readonly-net.network.domains]
"api.openai.com" = "allow"

Workspace write without network

default_permissions = "project-edit"

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"

[permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"." = "write"

[permissions.project-edit.network]
enabled = false

Workspace write with public web access

default_permissions = "workspace-net"

[permissions.workspace-net.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"

[permissions.workspace-net.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"." = "write"

[permissions.workspace-net.network]
enabled = true

[permissions.workspace-net.network.domains]
"*" = "allow"

Use the global "*" allow rule only when you intend to allow public network access. Deny rules can narrow a broad allowlist.

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Events

Define and select a profile

Configuration spec

Filesystem permissions

Deny reads with exact paths or globs

Network permissions

Local and private networks

Unix sockets

Migrate from older sandbox settings

Scope and enforcement

What profiles control

How enforcement works

Operational guidance

Common profiles

Read-only with network allowlist

Workspace write without network

Workspace write with public web access